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FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, and 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendants-Respondents. : Appeal No. 890378-CA 
000O000 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant Forsgren-Perkins Engineering ("Forsgren") does not 
contest the bulk of the procedural history as outlined in 
Respondent Mother Earth Industries ("MEI") Brief, with a few 
important exceptions. Forsgren does not intend to reply to every 
point raised by MEI, but for the sake of clarity the headings 
used by MEI in its brief will be retained for the purposes of 
this reply brief. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTION 
In paragraph 13, Forsgren notes that "Plaintiff's Exception 
to Order of Dismissal and Request for Hearing" were filed in 
court after Judge Eves had made his ruling. This may be strictly 
true, but obscures the fact that said document was mailed well 
before the deadline of five days established by local rule 2.9, 
and was therefore timely. 
In paragraph 14, MEI states that the Exception to Order was 
directed not at the language of the order, but to the underlying 
merits of the Order. Nowhere does rule 2.9 state that the 
objection is to be based solely upon the language of the order, 
and may not address the merits. As MEI does not address this 
issue in further in the Argument of its brief, it will not be 
further addressed here. 
POINT NO. 2 
THE EXCEPTION TO THE ORDER AND THE SUBSEQUENT 
MOTION FILED BY FORSGREN-PERKINS DID NOT 
EXTEND THE TIME FOR THE FILING OF AN APPEAL 
In Point No. 2 of its Argument, page 20, MEI asserts that 
Forsgren mistakenly cited State v. McMullen, 764 P.2d 42 (Utah 
App. 1988) for the purpose of stating that this court considers a 
"Request to Reconsider" the same as a Motion for a New Trial in a 
criminal context. Forsgren disagrees with MEI's interpretation 
of McMullen. In McMullen, the defendant first filed a Motion for 
a New Trial pursuant to the criminal rules of procedure. When 
this motion was denied, he then filed a "Request to Reconsider 
the Denial of the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial." In its 
argument, this court differentiates between the two motions by 
referring to them as the "initial" motion for a new trial and the 
"second" motion for a new trial. It then states that "the trial 
court was without power to alter its prior ruling upon the 
subsequent filing of what is, in essence, the same motion.", 
citations omitted. .Id., at 635. By the above statements, this 
court was at least implicitly recognizing the existence of a 
"Request to Reconsider" and its essential relationship to a 
Motion for a New Trial. In that case the court did not favor the 
Request to Reconsider not because it was a nullity, but because 
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the defendant had already availed himself of a Request for a New 
Trial and the Request to Reconsider was redundant. 
The McMullen fact situation is easily distinguishable from 
the instant case, because Forsgren did not request a new trial, 
and indeed could not request a new trial because it had never 
been afford an old one* There was in fact no regular procedure 
that Forsgren could follow under the unusual circumstances it 
found itself in. 
MEI also attempts to use the case of Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 
841 (Utah 1980), to buttress its position re the Motion for 
Modification. In the Peav case, the appellant had brought a 
Petition for Modification of his divorce decree, which was 
granted by the court. In the alternative to his petition he 
asked that the decree be vacated, however since his petition to 
modify was granted, the court struck the alternative plea. In 
spite of the fact that appellant had received what he prayed for, 
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition 
and Motion for Relief from Final Judgment. It is a rather 
unusual fact situation when a party appeals the granting of his 
own petition. In addition, it must be noted that Mr. Peay had a 
perfectly reasonable procedure available to him under URCP 59(e), 
to amend the judgment of the court, and instead chose to forge 
ahead with his own procedure. This contrasts sharply with the 
instant case, wherein Forsgren had no such shining path to 
follow. 
Finally, the strictures of Peav are implicitly overridden by 
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this court in Moon Lake Electric Assoc. v. Ultrasvstems Western 
Const., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988), which was discussed in 
some detail in appellant's original brief. In Moon Lake, the 
trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, and plaintiff 
filed a URCP 59 Motion for a New Trial. The trial court held 
that there was "no basis under Rule 59 for granting a new trial 
when in fact no trial was held." Id. at 126. On this reasoning 
defendant argued that there was no extension of time in which to 
file an appeal, and that the appellate court was without 
jurisdiction. This Court noted that: 
Neither Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (new trial) nor 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment) 
directly addresses the availability of a 
motion for a "new" trial following summary 
judgment. Our analysis of Rule 59(a) and the 
rationale behind it leads us to conclude that 
such a motion is, nonetheless, procedurally 
correct. 
Id. at 127. The court also held: 
While there may be some logic in concluding 
that there can be no new trial where no trial 
has yet occurred, we should be less concerned 
with what this "reconsideration" procedure 
may be called so long as the procedure is 
available to litigants. 
Id. at 127-8. 
The above quote suggested very strongly that this court 
would henceforth examine the substance more carefully than the 
form, and allow every final statement of a trial court a 
procedure for review short of appeal. As Forsgren's brief made 
clear, there was no clear procedure for petitioning for a review 
of the order available to it, hence its Motion for Modification. 
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POINT NO. 4 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDUCT WAS GOVERNED BY 
RULE 2.8 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE 
DISTRICT COURTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS IN CONFORMITY THEREWITH. 
In Point No. 4, page 24, MEI makes much of the fact that 
Forsgren did not reply to MEI's Motion for Change of Venue, and 
baldly states that Forsgren's brief does not address the issue. 
This is demonstrably wrong. Forsgren's brief twice addressed the 
issue of its lack of response to this motion. Specifically, page 
three of the brief states: 
On or about 27 April 1987 MEI moved for a 
change of venue to the Third District action, 
or in the alternative to dismiss or stay the 
action. A copy of said Motion is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B. 
The Motion for Dismissal in the Alternative 
was improper in this case because it stated 
that Forsgren had split its cause of action, 
but this is an error on the part of MEI. UCA 
§78-13-1(3) dictates that a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure can only be brought in the county 
where the action occurred, and Forsgren could 
not bring its foreclosure action in the Third 
District. Said statute provides only for a 
change of venue, to which Forsgren was 
prepared to acguiesce, hence its non-response 
to the Motion, (emphasis added) 
Also on page fifteen of said brief appears: 
Forsgren did not respond to the Motion for 
Change of Venue because there was a 
stipulated continuance, and because it was 
prepared to acquiesce to the change of venue. 
Forsgren was greatly surprised when the Court 
granted the Motion in the Alternative to 
Dismiss, because of the obvious error on the 
part of MEI in view of the venue statutes. 
When the court adopted the reasoning of MEI, 
it adopted the error as well, and the 
dismissal was in error. 
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It is fairly obvious that if a party is prepared to 
acquiesce to a motion brought by another, there is no need to 
file a responsive brief. MEI may dispute whether there was a 
stipulation, but it is apparent that Forsgren did in fact address 
the issue of its previous non-response in its brief. 
POINT NO. 5 
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED ITS 
RIGHT TO A FORECLOSURE OF THE MECHANICS [sic] 
LIEN WHEN IT FILED ITS COUNTER-CLAIM. THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DID NOT LACK 
JURISDICTION OVER THE LINE FORECLOSURE. 
Under Point No. 5, MEI cites UCA §78-13-1 to support its 
point that Forsgren could have moved its lien action to the Third 
District. As noted in the section immediately supra, Forsgren 
was prepared to yield to the motion for change of venue brought 
by MEI, which is why it didn't respond to said motion. However, 
Forsgren believes that in spite of the possibility of changing 
venue after filing, the original suit must be brought in the 
county where the property is located, so it could not have 
requested the Third District Court to foreclose a lien in Beaver 
County until the Fifth District Court granted a change of venue. 
Therefore the Third District Court did lack jurisdiction until 
jurisdiction was granted it by the Fifth District. 
POINT NO. 8 
FORSGREN-PERKINS SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THAT THE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL HAD BEEN SIGNED AND ENTERED BY THE 
COURT. 
In Point No. 8 MEI states that Forsgren should be charged 
with constructive notice that the order was signed, and asserts 
6 
that Forsgren made no effort to discover whether the order had 
been signed. Forsgren made at least one scheduled attempt to 
have a hearing before Judge Eves, (see attached Exhibit A) so it 
is wrong to state that no effort was made by Forsgren. As for 
MEI's assertions that the language used by Forsgren suggests that 
it knew of the entry of the order, that issue was addressed in 
Forsgren's Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, (attached as 
Exhibit B) wherein it is noted on page two: 
Appellant did submit some motions to the 
Court referring to the Order to Dismiss, but 
these were not submitted with the knowledge 
that the Order had actually been entered, but 
were designed to object to any prospective 
entry of the Order. This is borne out by 
Exhibit 3 attached to respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, which is plaintiff-
appellant's Memorandum in Re: Order for 
change of Venue or Dismissal Without 
Prejudice. Letter c. of the Preliminary 
Statement in said Memorandum states: 
"Recognize that if this claim is dismissed, 
and jLf it is not refiled within one year 
after the filing of the mechanic's lien the 
claim will be barred by the Statute of 
Limitations;" (emphasis added). The quoted 
language is indicative of an objection to a 
possible future occurrence, not an objection 
to a fait accompli. 
The quote speaks for itself, and demonstrate that Forsgren 
did not necessarily know that the order had in fact been entered. 
CONCLUSION 
Forsgren is not asking this court to foreclose its lien, or 
decide the case on its merits. All Forsgren wishes is the 
opportunity to litigate its lien claims in a full and fair trial. 
To do this, all Forsgren asks of this court is to remand this 
matter back to the Fifth District Court, with an order that the 
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case be reinstated there long enough to be consolidated with the 
ongoing Third District Action. This is what MEI initially 
requested from Judge Eves, and which Forsgren acquiesced to 
before the alternative Motion to Dismiss was granted. No one 
will be unduly prejudiced thereby, least of all MEI. 
DATED this 11th day of October, 1989. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Forsgren-Perkins Engineering 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed four copies 
of the foregoing Brief to Jack Schoenhals, 36 S. State #1200, 
SLC, UT 84111, on the above date. / / 
Chase Kimbal 
8 
ADDENDA AND EXHIBITS 
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L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff, Forsgren-Perkins Engineering 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, 
p.a., An Idaho Corporarion, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
•c 
K3THZR EARTH INDUSTRIES, INC., 
Delaware Corporation, and 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTION TO ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL AND REQUEST 
FOR HEARING 
Civil No. 87-010 
COMES NOW the plaintiff by and through the undersigned 
counsel to respectfully take exception to the Proposed Order of 
Dismissal herein and to Move the Court for an opportunity to 
address the matter by oral argument, to allow the matter to be 
fully and fairly addressed on the merits and to provide the Court 
with a balanced presentation herein. 
DATED this day of May, 1987. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
Earl ST Spafford 
L. Charles Spafford 
Attorney for Plainriff, 
Forsgren-Perkins Enginee 
ring 
L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
CHASE KIMBALL (4993) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
I 
FORSGREN-PERKINS ENGINEERING, I RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS 
S APPEAL OR FOR AN ORDER 
Appellant, 1 AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
f LOWER COURT 
v. I 
I 
MOTHER EARTH INDUSTRIES, and 5 
DELANO DEVELOPMENT, 1 Appeal No. 89-0099 
1 
Respondents. 5 
1 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW THE APPELLANT, who respectfully submits this brief 
in Response to the above-named Motion of the respondents. 
BACKGROUND 
1. An Order of Dismissal was submitted to the District 
Court and served on appellant on or about 28 May 1987. 
2. Appellant objected thereto the next day, pursuant to 
then current local rule 2.9(b). 
3. The Order was entered prior to the expiration of the 
five day objection period, and the Objection was evidently not 
entertained by Judge Eves in spite of its timeliness. >< 
4. The court never notified appellant that the Order had CO 
been entered over its timely objection. 
5. Appellant did submit some motions to the Court referring 
t n 1-he» f l r H o r ir\ Hi ami c e _ hut- f - h c s o u o r e t i n t e n h m i t t o H w4 1-h t h e 
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knowledge that the Order had actually been entered, but were 
designed to object to any prospective entry of the Order. This 
is borne out by Exhibit 3 attached to respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, which is plaintiff-appellant's Memorandum in Re: 
Order for change of Venue or Dismissal Without Prejudice. Letter 
c. of the Preliminary Statement in said Memorandum states: 
"Recognize that if. this claim is dismissed, and jLf it is not 
refiled within one year after the filing of the mechanic's lien 
the claim will be barred by the Statute of Limitations;" 
(emphasis added). The quoted language is indicative of an 
objection to a possible future occurrence, not an objection to a 
fait accompli. 
6. Upon discovery that the Order had in fact been entered, 
appellant submitted a Motion for Modification of the Order. 
7. Said Motion for Modification was denied, hence the 
instant appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL 
Appellant freely admits that it cited UCA § 78-2-2(3)(i) as 
the basis for jurisdiction. The rules have evidently changed 
slightly since 1 January 1988 when the rules were penultimately 
adjusted, and it is proper now to cite subsection (j) rather than 
(i). Appellant believes this to be the most ephemeral of 
harmless mistakes, amounting to no more than a typographical 
error, and suggests that this honorable Court should not dismiss 
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an appeal for a typographical error. 
Appellant also cites URCP 73 as the basis for the appeal, 
evidently to the dismay of the respondent. Formerly URCP 73 was 
the rule used for appeals until its sections dealing with Supreme 
Court appeals was repealed in 1985, leaving only the sections 
dealing with appeals to the District Court. Appellant cited it 
merely as a formality, much the way respondent gives parallel 
cites for cases in its Motion to Dismiss Appeal, for the sake of 
completeness rather than with the suspicion that someone will 
really prefer to use the defunct Utah Reporter rather than the 
annotated Pacific Reporter. Appellant does not believe that a 
superfluous cite given for the sake of completeness will divest 
this Court of jurisdiction, and draws this Court's attention to 
the suggestive lack of anything other than ipse dixits from 
respondent that the appeal should be dismissed on these grounds. 
Respondent fails to support this section of its argument with any 
case law or statutes. 
Respondent also finds fault with appellant's cite of RUSC 3 
and 4 as the basis for the appeal. This argument of respondent 
is the purest sophistry. RUSC 3(a) states: "An appeal may be 
taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from all final 
orders and judgments,...by filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4." 
Appellant does not have a duty to prove that its appeal is "as of 
right", rather it has a duty to appeal from a final order in the 
proper fashion. 
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This duty has been met by appellant. One cannot appeal an 
Order that one does not know has been entered over a proper 
objection. This is analogous to the tolling of the statute of 
limitations in the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act", UCA SS 78-
14-1 et seq. This Act mandates that the statute of limitations 
on tort actions will be tolled until the malpractice is 
discovered, see § 78-14-4, and appellant submits to this Court 
that a similar discovery standard should apply for filing a 
notice of appeal from an Order. 
After the discovery of the entry of the Order, appellant 
made a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. Several recent 
Utah cases examine the Motion for Reconsideration as it applies 
to the appeals process. State v. McMullen, 95 Utah Adv. Rep 33 
(Utah App. 1988) recognizes the "Request to Reconsider" as being 
essentially the same as a Motion for a New Trial in the criminal 
context, or by extrapolation the same as a URCP 59 motion. 
Salt Lake City, Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 90 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. 1988) also deals with a Motion for 
Reconsideration. Said case observes that the Motion for 
Reconsideration is not expressly available under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but notes that in the context of that 
particular case the motion was implied by the wording of URCP 54, 
and the court adopted a "substance over form" attitude. 
The most recent, and for the purposes of this memorandum the 
most important of these cases, is Moon Lake Electric Assoc, v. 
Ultrasystems Western Const., 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 
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1988). In Moon Lake, the trial court granted summary judgment 
for defendant, and plaintiff filed a URCP 59 Motion for a New 
Trial. The trial court held that there was "no basis under Rule 
59 for granting a new trial when in fact no trial was held." Id. 
at 26. On this reasoning defendant argued that there was no 
extension of time in which to file an appeal, and that the 
appellate court was without jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 
noted that: 
"Neither Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (new trial) nor Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment) directly addresses the 
availability of a motion for a "new" trial following 
summary judgment. Our analysis of Rule 59(a) and the 
rationale behind it leads us to conclude that such a 
motion is, nonetheless, procedurally correct." 
Id. at 26. The court also held: 
"While there may be some logic in concluding that there 
can be no new trial where no trial has yet occurred, we 
should be less concerned with what this 
"reconsideration" procedure may be called so long as 
the procedure is available to litigants." 
Id. at 26. The court then goes on to note that since this motion 
was considered proper pursuant to URCP 59, it also tolled the 
time for appeal, and the appeal was therefore proper and within 
their jurisdiction. The above language spells out succinctly the 
court's attitude that it will consider substance over form in 
motions of this type, and implicitly overrules Peay v. Peay, 607 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), upon which respondent relies so heavily. 
Utah law provides for a tolling of the time to appeal when a 
Motion for a New Trial is made. See Schaneveldt v. Cleqgf 280 P. 
230, (Utah 1929). RUSC 4(b) also provides for the tolling of the 
time when URCP 59 motions are made. Equity would dictate the 
same tolling during a Motion for Reconsideration. 
Even if defendant had wished it, it could not have properly 
filed a Notice of Appeal while the trial Court was entertaining 
its Motion for Reconsideration. The above-cited rule 4(b) 
states: "A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any 
of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the 
entry of the order of the district court,... disposing of the 
motion as provided above." Defendant did not file a notice of 
appeal because it considered its Motion for Reconsideration to be 
the same as a URCP 59 motion, and was aware that the appellate 
rules would render it a useless act. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant made a good faith effort to obtain a rehearing on 
an Order, and followed the rules during its attempt to get relief 
before beginning the expense of an appeal. It flies in the face 
of logic that appellant would be in such a position without 
redress. The cases cited, supra, show that the appellate process 
is becoming less strict, and the courts have adopted a spirit 
favoring substance and equity over form. 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that the Motions of respondent 
be dismissed, and for costs and legal fees for having to 
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respond. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C. 
Chase Kimball 
Attorney for Appellant 
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RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF 
JUDGMENT 
(a) Grounds. 
(b) Time for Motion. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend • Judgment. 
(a) Grounds. 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial 
may be granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact 
and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prev-
ented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one 
or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to 
any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort 
to a determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
. prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for Motion. 
A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than ten days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. 
When the application for a new trial is made 
under subdivisions (1). (2), (3), or (4), it shall be 
supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a 
new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has ten 
days after such service within which to serve oppo-
sing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits 
or opposing affidavits shall be served may be exte-
nded for an additional period not exceeding twenty 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may 
permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. 
Not later than ten days after entry of judgmen 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial 
for any reason for which it might have granted a 
new trial on motion of a party, and in the order 
shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. 
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than ten days after entry of the 
judgment. 
RULE 2.9. WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, 
AND DECREES 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party 
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen 
(15) days, or within shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judg-
ment or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, 
and/or Orders shall be served on opposing counsel 
before being presented to the court for signature 
unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of object-
ions thereto shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within five (5) days after service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for 
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
